A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action, then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize his payoff given the follower's best response. In this paper we present an approach to solving for the leader's optimal strategy in certain Stackelberg games where the follower's utility function (and thus the subsequent best response of the follower) is unknown.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the following two natural problems:
1. Profit Maximization via Revealed Preferences: A retailer, who sells d goods, repeatedly interacts with a buyer. In each interaction, the retailer decides how to price the d goods by choosing p ∈ R d + , and in response, the buyer purchases the bundle x ∈ R d + that maximizes her utility v(x) − x, p , where v is an unknown concave valuation function. The retailer observes the bundle purchased, and therefore his profit, which is x, p − c(x), where c is an unknown convex cost function. The retailer would like to set prices that maximize his profit after only a polynomial number of interactions with the buyer.
Optimal Tolling via Revealed Behavior:
A municipal authority administers m roads that form a network G = (V, E).
Each road e ∈ E of the network has an unknown latency function e : R+ → R+ which determines the time it takes to traverse the road given a level of congestion. The authority has the power to set constant tolls τe ∈ R+ on the roads in an attempt to manipulate traffic flow. In rounds, the authority sets tolls, and then observes the Nash equilibrium flow induced by the non-atomic network congestion game defined by the unknown latency functions and the tolls, together with the social cost (average total latency) of the flow. The authority would like to set tolls that minimize the social cost after only a polynomial number of rounds.
Although these problems are quite different, they share at least one important feature-the retailer and the municipal authority each wish to optimize an unknown objective function given only query access to it. That is, they have the power to choose some set of prices or tolls, and then observe the value of their objective function that results from that choice. This kind of problem (alternately called bandit or zeroth order optimization) is well-studied, and is well understood in cases in which the unknown objective being maximized (resp. minimized) is concave (resp. convex). Unfortunately, the two problems posed above share another important feature-when posed Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
as bandit optimization problems, the objective function being maximized (resp. minimized) is generally not concave (resp. convex). For the profit maximization problem, even simple instances lead to a non concave objective function. Example 1. Consider a setting with one good (d = 1). The buyer's valuation function v(x) = √ x, and the retailer's cost function is c(x) = x. The buyer's utility for buying x units at price p is √ x − x · p. Thus, if the price is p, a utility-maximizing buyer will purchase x * (p) = 1 4p 2 units. The profit of the retailer is then
Unfortunately, this profit function is not concave.
Since the retailer's profit function is not concave in the prices, it cannot be optimized efficiently using generic methods for concave maximization. This phenomenon persists into higher dimensions, where it is not clear how to efficiently maximize the non-concave objective. The welfare objective in the tolling problem is also nonconvex in the tolls. We give an example in Appendix A.
Surprisingly, despite this non-convexity, we show that both of these problems can be solved efficiently subject to certain mild conditions. More generally, we show how to solve a large family of Stackelberg games in which the utility function of the "follower" is unknown. A Stackelberg game is played by a leader and a follower. The leader moves first and commits to an action (e.g., setting prices or tolls as in our examples), and then the follower best responds, playing the action that maximizes her utility given the leader's action. The leader's problem is to find the action that will optimize his objective (e.g., maximizing profit, or minimizing social cost as in our examples) after the follower best responds to this action.
Traditionally, Stackelberg games are solved assuming that the leader knows the follower's utility function, and thus his own utility function. But this assumption is very strong, and in many realistic settings the follower's utility function will be unknown. Our results give general conditions-and several natural examples-under which the problem of computing an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium can be solved efficiently with only revealed preferences feedback to the follower's utility function.
For clarity of exposition, we first work out our solution in detail for the special case of profit maximization from revealed preferences.We then derive and state our general theorem for optimally solving a class of Stackelberg games where the follower's utility is unknown. Finally, we show how to apply the general theorem to other problems, including the optimal tolling problem mentioned above and a natural principal-agent problem.
Our Results and Techniques
The main challenge in solving our class of Stackelberg games is that for many natural examples, the leader's objective function is not concave when written as a function of his own action. For instance, in our example, the retailer's profit is not concave as a function of the price he sets. Our first key ingredient is to show that in many natural settings, the leader's objective is concave when written as a function of the follower's action.
Consider again the retailer's profit maximization problem. Recall that if the buyer's valuation function v(x) = √ x, then when she faces a price p, she will buy the bundle x * (p) = 1/4p 2 . In this simple case, we can see that setting a price of p * (x) = 1/2 √ x will induce the buyer to purchase x units. In principle, we can now write the retailer's profit function as a function of the bundle x. In our example, the retailer's cost function is simply c(x) = x. So,
Written in terms of x, the profit function is concave! As we show, this phenomenon continues in higher dimensions, for arbitrary convex cost functions c and for a wide class of concave valuation functions satisfying certain technical conditions, including the well studied families of CES and Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
Thus, if the retailer had access to an oracle for the concave function Profit(x), we could use an algorithm for bandit concave optimization to maximize the retailer's profit. Unfortunately, the retailer does not directly get to choose the bundle purchased by the buyer and observe the profit for that bundle: he can only set prices and observe the buyer's chosen bundle x * (p) at those prices, and the resulting profit Profit(x * (p)). Nevertheless, we have reduced the retailer's problem to a possibly simpler one. In order to find the profit maximizing prices, it suffices to give an algorithm which simulates access to an oracle for Profit(x) given only the retailer's query access to x * (p) and Profit(x * (p)). Specifically, if for a given bundle x, the retailer could find prices p such that the buyer's chosen bundle x * (p) = x, then he could simulate access to Profit(x) by setting prices p and receiving Profit(x * (p)) = Profit(x). Our next key ingredient is a "tâtonnement-like" procedure that efficiently finds prices that approximately induce a target bundle x given only access to x * (p), provided that the buyer's valuation function is Hölder continuous and strongly concave on the set of feasible bundles. Specifically, given a target bundle x, our procedure finds prices p such that |Profit(x * (p)) − Profit(x)|≤ ε. Thus, we can use our procedure to simulate approximate access to the function Profit(x). Our procedure requires only poly(d, 1/ε) queries to x * (p). Using recent algorithms for bandit optimization due to Belloni et al. [6] , we can maximize the retailer's profits efficiently even with only approximate access to Profit(x). When our algorithms receive noiseless feedback, we can improve the dependence on the approximation parameter ε to be only poly(log 1/ε).
A similar approach can be used to solve the optimal tolling problem assuming the unknown latency functions are convex and strictly increasing. As in the preceding example, the municipal authority's objective function (social cost) is not convex in the tolls, but is convex in the induced flow. Whenever the latency function are strictly increasing, the potential function of the routing game is strongly convex, and so we can use our tâtonnement procedure to find tolls that induce target flows at equilibrium.
Our results for maximizing profits and optimizing tolls follow from a more general method that allows the leader in a large class of continuous action Stackelberg game to iteratively and efficiently maximize his objective function while only observing the follower's response. The class requires the following conditions:
1. The follower's utility function is strongly concave in her own actions and linear in the leader's actions.
2. The leader's objective function is concave when written as a function of the follower's actions. 1 Finally, we show that our techniques are tolerant to two different kinds of noise. Our techniques work even if the follower only approximately maximizes his utility function, which corresponds to bounded, but adversarially chosen noise -and also if unbounded, but well behaved (i.e. zero mean and bounded variance) noise is introduced into the system. To illustrate this noise tolerance, we show how to solve a simple d-dimensional principal-agent problem, in which the principal contracts for the production of d types of goods that are produced as a stochastic function of the agent's actions.
Related Work
There is a very large literature in operations research on solving so-called "bilevel programming" problems, which are closely related to Stackelberg games. Similar to a Stackelberg game, the variables in a bilevel programming problem are partitioned into two "levels." The second-level variables are constrained to be the optimal solution to some problem defined by the first-level variables. See [13] for a survey of the bilevel programming literature. Unlike our work, this literature does not focus substantially on computational issues (many of the algorithms are not polynomial time). [16] show that optimally solving certain discrete Stackelberg games is NP-hard. Even ignoring computational efficiency, this literature assumes knowledge of the objective function of the "follower." Our work departs significantly from this literature by assuming that the leader has no knowledge of the follower's utility function.
There are two other works that we are aware of that consider solving Stackelberg games when the follower's utility function is unknown. Letchford, Conitzer, and Munagala [17] give algorithms for learning optimal leader strategies with a number of queries that is polynomial in the number of pure strategies of the leader. In our setting, the leader has a continuous and high dimensional action space, and so the results of [17] do not apply. Blum, Haghtalab, and Procaccia [8] consider the problem of learning optimal strategies for the leader in a class of security games. They exploit the structure of security games to learn optimal strategies for the leader in a number of queries that is polynomial in the representation size of the game (despite the fact that the number of pure strategies is exponential). The algorithm of [8] is not computationally efficient -indeed, the problem they are solving is NP-hard. Neither of these techniques apply to our setting -and despite the fact that in our setting the leader has a continuous action space (which is exponentially large even under discretization), we are able to give an algorithm with both polynomial query complexity and polynomial running time.
There is also a body of related work related to our main example of profit maximization. Specifically, there is a recent line of work on learning to predict from revealed preferences ( [5, 23, 4] ). In this line, the goal is to predict buyer behavior, rather than to optimize seller prices. Following these works, Amin et al. [1] considered how to find profit maximizing pricing from revealed preferences in the special case in which the buyer has a linear utility function and a fixed budget. The technique of [1] is quite specialized to linear utility functions, and does not easily extend to more general utility functions in the profit maximization problem, and not to Stackelberg games in general. "Revealed preferences" queries are quite similar to demand queries (see e.g. [10] ). Demand queries are known to be sufficient to find welfare optimal allocations, and more generally, to be able to solve separable convex programs whose objective is social welfare. In contrast, our optimization problem is non-convex (and so the typical methodology by which demand queries are used does not apply), and our objective is not welfare.
The profit maximization application can be viewed as a dynamic pricing problem in which the seller has no knowledge of the buyers utilities. Babaioff et al. [2] study a version of this problem that is incomparable to our setting. On the one hand, the result of [2] works for distributions over buyers. On the other hand, it is limited to selling a single type of good, whereas our algorithms apply to selling bundles of many types of goods. There is also work related to our optimal tolling problem. In an elegant paper, Bhaskar et al. [7] study how one can iteratively find tolls such that a particular target flow is an equilibrium of a non-atomic routing game where the latency functions are unknown, which is a sub-problem we also need to solve in the routing application. Their technique is specialized to routing games, and requires that the unknown latency functions have a known simple functional form (linear or low-degree convex polynomial). In contrast, our technique works quite generally, and in the special case of routing games, does not require the latency functions to satisfy any known functional form (or even be convex). Our technique can also be implemented in a noise tolerant way, although at the expense of having a polynomial dependence on the approximation parameter, rather than a polylogarithmic dependence (in the absence of noise, our method can also be implemented to depend only polylogarithmically on the approximation parameter.)
Finally, our work is related in motivation to a recent line of work designed to study the sample complexity of auctions [3, 12, 15, 14, 11, 9, 20] . In this line of work, like in our work, the goal is to optimize an objective in a game theoretic setting when the designer has no direct knowledge of participant's utility functions.
PRELIMINARIES
We will denote the set of non-negative real numbers by R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} and the set of positive real numbers by R>0 = {x ∈ R | x > 0}. For a set C ⊆ R d and a norm · , we will use C = sup x∈C x to denote the diameter of C with respect to the norm · . When the norm is unspecified, · will denote the Euclidean norm · 2.
An important concept we use is the interior of a set. In the following, we will use Bu to denote the unit ball centered at u for any u ∈ R d .
Definition 1.
For any δ > 0 and any set C ⊆ R d , the δ-interior Int C,δ of C is a subset of C such that a point x is in the δ-interior Int C,δ of C if the ball of radius δ centered at x is contained in C, that is:
The interior IntC of C is a subset of C such that a point x is in IntC if there exists some δ > 0 such that x is in Int C,δ .
We will also make use of the notions of Hölder continuity and Lipschitzness.
A function f is λ-Lipschitz if it is (λ, 1)-Hölder continuous.
Projected Subgradient Descent
A key ingredient in our algorithms is the ability to minimize a convex function (or maximize a concave function), given access only to the subgradients of the function (i.e. with a so-called "firstorder" method). For concreteness, in this paper we do so using the projected sub gradient descent algorithm. This algorithm has the property that it is noise-tolerant, which is important in some of our applications. However, we note that any other noise-tolerant firstorder method could be used in place of gradient descent to obtain qualitatively similar results. In fact, we show in the full version that for applications that do not require noise tolerance, we can use the Ellipsoid algorithm, which obtains an exponentially better dependence on the approximation parameter. Because we strive for generality, in the body of the paper we restrict attention to gradient descent.
Let C ⊆ R d be a compact and convex set that is contained in a Euclidean ball of radius R, centered at some point x1 ∈ R d . Let c : R d → R be a convex "loss function." Assume that c is also λ-Lipschitz--that is, |c(x) − c(y)|≤ λ x − y 2. Let ΠC denote the projection operator onto C,
Projected subgradient descent is an iterative algorithm that starts at x1 ∈ C and iterates the following equations
The algorithm has the following guarantee.
Theorem 3. The projected subgradient descent algorithm with
Alternatively, the algorithm finds a solution within ε of optimal after T = (Rλ/ε) 2 steps.
Strong Convexity
We will make essential use of strong convexity/concavity of certain functions.
We say φ is σ-strongly concave if (−φ) is σ-strongly convex.
An extremely useful property of strongly convex functions is that any point in the domain that is close to the minimum in objective value is also close to the minimum in Euclidean distance.
Lemma 5. Let φ: C → R be a σ-strongly convex function, and let x * = argmin x∈C φ(x) be the minimizer of φ. Then, for any
Similarly, if φ is σ-strongly concave, and x * = argmax x∈C φ(x), then for any x ∈ C,
Tools for Zeroth-Order Optimization
We briefly discuss a useful tool for noisy zeroth-order optimization (also known as bandit optimization) by [6] , which will be used as blackbox algorithm in our framework. The important feature we require, satisfied by the algorithm from [6] is that the optimization procedure be able to tolerate a small amount of adversarial noise.
Let C be a well-rounded convex set in R d and F, f : R d → R be functions such that f is convex and F satisfies
for some ε > 0. The function F can be seen as an oracle that gives a noisy evaluation of f at any point in C. Belloni et al. [6] give an algorithm that finds a point x ∈ C that approximately optimizes the convex function f and only uses function evaluations of F at points in x ∈ C. The set C only needs to be specified via a membership oracle that decides if a point x is in C or not.
Lemma 7 ([6], Corollary 1).
Let C be a well-rounded set in R d and f and F be functions that satisfy Equation (1). There is an algorithm ZOO(ε, C) (short for zeroth-order optimization) that makesÕ(d 4.5 ) calls 2 to F and returns a point x ∈ C such that
Naturally, the algorithm can also be used to approximately maximize a concave function.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION FROM REVEALED PREFERENCES

The Model and Problem Setup
Consider the problem of maximizing profit from revealed preferences. In this problem, there is a producer, who wants to sell a bundle x of d divisible goods to a consumer. The bundles are vectors x ∈ C where C ⊆ R d + is some set of feasible bundles that we assume is known to both the producer and consumer.
• The producer has an unknown cost function c :
He is allowed to set prices p ∈ R d + for each good, and receives profit
where x * (p) is the bundle of goods the consumer purchases at prices p. His goal is to find the profit maximizing prices
• The consumer has a valuation function v :
The valuation function is unknown to the producer. The consumer has a quasi-linear utility function u(x, p) = v(x) − p, x . Given prices p, the consumer will buy the bundle x * (p) ∈ C that maximizes her utility. Thus,
We call x * (p) the induced bundle at prices p.
In our model, in each time period t the producer will choose prices p t and can observe the resulting induced bundle x * (p t ) and profit r(p t ). We would like to design an algorithm so that after a polynomial number of observations T , the profit r(p T ) is nearly as large as the optimal profit r(p * ). We will make several assumptions about the functions c and v and the set C. We view these assumptions as comparatively mild: 
Lastly, C is downward closed, in the sense that for any x ∈ C, there exists some δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ x ∈ C (the consumer can always choose buy less of each good). Note that without the assumption that the consumer's valuation function is concave and that the producer's cost function is convex, even with full information, their corresponding optimization problems would not be polynomial time solvable. Our fourth assumption of homogeneity is more restrictive , but as we observe, is satisfied by a wide range of economically meaningful valuation functions including CES and Cobb-Douglas utilities. Informally, homogeneity is a scale-invariance condition -changing the units by which quantities of goods are measured should have a predictable multiplicative effect on the buyer valuation functions:
The function v is simply homogeneous if it is homogeneous of degree k for some k ≥ 0.
Our fourth assumption is simply that the buyer valuation function is homogeneous of some degree: Assumption 3.4. The consumer's valuation function v is homogeneous.
An Overview of Our Solution
We present our solution in three main steps:
1. First, we show that the profit function can be expressed as a concave function r(x) of the consumer's induced bundle x, rather than as a (non-concave) function of the prices.
2. Next, we show that for a given candidate bundle x, we can iteratively find prices p such that x ≈ x * (p). That is, in each time period s we can set prices p s and observe the purchased bundle x * (p s ), and after a polynomial number of time periods S, we are guaranteed to find prices p = p S such that x * (p) ≈ x. Once we have found such prices, we can observe the profit r(x * (p)) ≈ r(x), which allows us to simulate query access to r(x).
3. Finally, we use our simulated query access to r(x) as feedback to a bandit concave optimization algorithm, which iteratively queries bundles x, and quickly converges to the profit maximizing bundle.
Express Profit as a Function of the Bundle
First, we carry out
Step 1 above and demonstrate how to rewrite the profit function as a function of the bundle x, rather than as a function of the prices p. Note that for any given bundle x ∈ C, there might be multiple price vectors that induce x. We denote the set of price vectors that induce x by:
We then define the profit of a bundle x to be
Observe that the profit maximizing price vector p ∈ P * (x) is the price vector that maximizes revenue p, x , since the cost c(x) depends only on x, and so is the same for every p ∈ P * (x). The following lemma characterizes the revenue maximizing price vector that induces any fixed bundle x ∈ C. Lemma 9. Let x ∈ C be a bundle, and P * ( x) be the set of price vectors that induce bundle x. Then the price vector p = ∇v( x) is the revenue maximizing price vector that induces x. That is, ∇v( x) ∈ P * ( x) and for any price vector p ∈ P * ( x), p , x ≤ ∇v( x), x .
Proof. Observe that for any x ∈ C the gradient of the consumer's utility u(x, p) = v(x) − p, x with respect to x is (∇v − p). If the prices are p = ∇v( x), then since v is concave and ∇v( x) − p = 0, x is a maximizer of the consumer's utility function. Thus, we have x * (∇v( x)) = x, and so ∇v( x) ∈ P * ( x). Suppose that there exists another price vector p ∈ P * ( x) such that p = ∇v( x). Since the function u(·, p ) is concave in x and x ∈ arg maxx∈C u(x, p ), we know that for any
otherwise there is a feasible ascent direction, which contradicts the assumption that x maximizes u(x, p ). By Assumption 3.1, we know there exists some δ < 1 such that δ x ∈ C. Now consider x = δ x, then it follows that
Therefore, p , x ≤ ∇v(x), x , as desired. This completes the proof.
With this characterization of the revenue maximizing price vector, we can then rewrite the profit as a function of x in closed form for any x ∈ C:
Next, we show that r(x) is a concave function of x whenever the valuation v satisfies Assumption 3.3 (concavity and differentiability) and Assumption 3.4 (homogeneity).
Theorem 10. If the consumer's valuation function v is differentiable, homogeneous, and concave over C, the producer's profit function r(x) = ∇v(x), x − c(x) is concave over the domain C.
To prove this result, we invoke Euler's theorem for homogeneous functions:
Theorem 11 (Euler's Homogeneous Functions Theorem). Let v : C → R+ be continuous and differentiable. Then v is homogeneous of degree k if and only if
Proof of Theorem 10. Recall that:
By the assumption that v is continuous, differentiable, and homogeneous of some degree k ≥ 0, we have by Euler's theorem that
Because by assumption, v(x) is concave, and c(x) is convex, we conclude that r(x) is concave.
Finally, we note that many important and well studied classes of valuation functions satisfy our assumptions -namely differentiability, strong concavity and homogeneity. Two classes of interest include
• Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). Valuation functions of the form:
where αi > 0 for every i ∈ [d] and ρ, β > 0 such that ρ < 1 and βρ < 1. These functions are known to be differentiable, Hölder continuous and strongly concave over the set (0, H] d (see the full version for a proof). Observe that v(σx) = (
, so these functions are homogeneous of degree k = ρβ.
• Cobb-Douglas. These are valuation functions of the form
Converting Bundles to Prices
Next, we carry out Step 2 and show how to find prices p to induce a given bundle x. Specifically, the producer has a target bundle x ∈ C in mind, and would like to learn a price vector p ∈ R d + such that the induced bundle x * ( p) is "close" to x. That is,
for some ε > 0. Our solution will actually only allow us to produce a price vector p such that x and x * ( p) are "close in value." That is
However, by strong concavity of the valuation function, this will be enough to guarantee that the actual bundle is close to the target bundle. The following is just an elaboration of assumption 3.3: 
Our algorithm LearnPrice( x, ε) is given as Algorithm 1. We will prove: Theorem 12. Let x ∈ C be a target bundle and ε > 0. Then LearnPrice( x, ε) outputs a price vector p such that the induced bundle satisfies x − x * ( p) ≤ ε and the number of observations it needs is no more than
Algorithm 1 Learning the price vector to induce a target bundle: LearnPrice( x, ε) Input: A target bundle x ∈ C, and target accuracy ε Initialize: restricted price space
For t = 1, . . . , T : Observe the purchased bundle by the consumer x * (p t ) Update price vector with projected subgradient descent:
To analyze LearnPrice( x, ε), we will start by defining the following convex program whose solution is the target bundle x.
such that xj ≤ xj for every good
Since v is non-decreasing, it is not hard to see that x is the optimal solution. The partial Lagrangian of this program is defined as follows,
where pj is the dual variable for each constraint (4) and is interpreted as the price of good j. By strong duality, we know that there is a value OPT such that
We know that OPT = v( x) because x is the optimal solution to (3)-(4).
We can also define the Lagrange dual function g:
We will show that an approximately optimal price vector for g approximately induces the target bundle x, and that LearnPrice( x, ε) is using projected subgradient descent to find such a solution to g. In order to reason about the convergence rate of the algorithm, we restrict the space of the prices to the following bounded set:
First, we can show that the minimax value of the Lagrangian remains closed to OPT even if we restrict the prices to the set P.
Lemma 13. There exists a value R-OPT such that
Proof. Since C and P are both convex and P is also compact, the minimax theorem [22] shows that there is a value R-OPT such that
Since P ⊆ R d + , by (5), we have R-OPT ≥ v( x). Thus, we only need to show that R-OPT ≤ v( x) + α, where α = ε 2 σ/4. Let (x • , p • ) be a pair of minimax strategies for (7). That is
Suppose not, then we have
Now consider the bundle y such that yj = max{x
(1−β)/β , then we can construct the following price vector p ∈ P such that p j = L for each good j with x • j > xj, and p j = 0 for all other goods. Since we assume that v is (λ val , β)-Hölder continuous with respect to 2 norm, we have
It follows that
Suppose that y − x 2≥ 1 or β = 1, we know that y − x
Next suppose that y − x 2< 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). We also have that
is also positive,
. By the choice of our L,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the minimax value of (7) is no more than v( x) + α.
The preceding lemma shows that x is a primal optimal solution (even when prices are restricted). Therefore, if p = argmin p∈P g(p) are the prices that minimize the Lagrangian dual, we must have that x = x * ( p) is the induced bundle at prices p. The next lemma shows that if p are prices that approximately minimize the Lagrangian dual, then the induced bundle x * (p ) is close to x. Lemma 14. Let p ∈ P be a price vector such that g(p ) ≤ minp∈P g(p) + α. Let x = x * (p ) be the induced bundle at prices p . Then x satisfies
Proof. Let R-OPT denote the Lagrangian value when we restrict the price space to P. From Lemma 13, we have that R-OPT = minp∈P g(p) ∈ [v( x), v( x) + α]. By assumption, we also have
Note that L( x, p ) = v( x) − p , x − x = v( x) and x is the maximizer for L(·, p ), so it follows that
Since we know that v is a σ-strongly concave function over C, the utility function u(·, p ) = v(·) − p , · is also σ-strongly concave over C. 3 Then we have the following by Lemma 5 and the above argument,
Based on Lemma 14, we can reduce the problem of finding the appropriate prices to induce the target bundle to finding the approximate optimal solution to argmin p∈P g(p). Even though the function g is unknown to the producer (because v is unknown), we can still approximately optimize the function using projected subgradient descent if we are provided access to subgradients of g. The next lemma shows that the bundle x * (p) purchased by the consumer gives a subgradient of the Lagrange dual objective function at p. Lemma 15. Let p be any price vector, and x * (p) be the induced bundle. Then
, we know by the envelope theorem that a subgradient of g can be obtained as follows
Note that x corresponds to the induced bundle of p because
Therefore, the vector ( x − x * (p)) is a subgradient of g at the price vector p. Now that we know the subgradients of the function g at p can be easily obtained from the induced bundle purchased by the consumer, it remains to observe that Algorithm LearnPrice( x, ε) is performing projected gradient descent on the Lagrange dual objective, and to analyze its convergence.
Proof of Theorem 12. By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that the price vector p returned by projected gradient descent satisfies
Note that the set P is contained in the 2 ball centered at 0 with radius L. Also, for each p t , the subgradient we obtain is bounded:
we can apply the guarantee of projected gradient descent from Theorem 3, which gives:
By Lemma 14, we know that the resulting bundle
Remark 16. Since noise tolerance is not required in this setting, it is possible approximately induce the target bundle only using poly-logarithmically in (1/ε) number of observations. We will give an ellipsoid-based variant of LearnPrice in the full version that achieves this guarantee.
Profit Maximization
Finally, we will show how to combine the algorithm LearnPrice with the zeroth order optimization algorithm ZOO to find the approximate profit-maximizing price vector. At a high level, we will use ZOO to (approximately) optimize the profit function r over the bundle space and use LearnPrice to (approximately) induce the optimal bundle.
Before we show how to use ZOO, we will verify that if we run the algorithm LearnPrice to obtain prices p that approximately induce the desired bundle x, and observe the revenue generated from prices p, we will indeed obtain an approximation to the revenue function r(x).
Recall from Lemma 9 that the profit function can be written as a function of the bundle
as long as the producer uses the profit maximizing price vector ∇v(x) to induce the bundle x. However, the price vector returned by LearnPrice might not be the optimal price vector for the induced bundle. In order to have an estimate of the optimal profit for each bundle, we need to guarantee that prices returned by LearnPrice are the profit maximizing ones. To do that, we will restrict the bundle space that ZOO is optimizing over to be the interior of C. Now we show that for every bundle in the interior of C, there is a unique price vector that induces that bundle. Thus, these prices are the profit-maximizing prices inducing that bundle.
Lemma 17. Let x be a bundle in IntC . Then ∇v(x ) is the unique price vector that induces x .
Proof. Let p be a price vector such that x * (p ) = x. Since IntC ⊆ C, we must have
By the definition of IntC , we know that there exists some δ > 0 such that the ball δB x is contained in C. Now consider the function f : R d → R such that f (x) = u(x, p ). It follows that x is a local optimum of f neighborhood δB x . Since f is continuously differentiable, we must have ∇f (x ) = 0 by first-order conditions. Therefore, we must have
which implies that p = ∇v(x ).
Instead of using the interior itself, we will use a simple and efficiently computable proxy for the interior obtained by slightly shifting and contracting C.
Claim 18. For any 0 < δ < 1/2, let the set
where 1 denotes the d-dimensional vector with 1 in each coordinate. Given Assumption 3.1, C δ is contained in the (δ/2)-interior of C. That is, C δ ⊆ Int C,δ/2 .
Proof. Our goal is to show that C δ + δB0 ⊆ C, where B0 denote the unit ball centered at 0. Any point in C δ + (δ/2)B0 can be written as x + (δ/2) y for x ∈ C δ and y ∈ B0. We will show that x + (δ/2) y ∈ C. Since x ∈ C δ , there exists x ∈ C such that
Since y ∈ B0, there exists y ∈ (0, 1] d such that
To see this, note that (0, 1] d contains a ball of radius 1/4 whose center is (1/2)·1. By Assumption 3.1, C contains (0, 1] d , so y ∈ C. Therefore for some x, y ∈ C,
where we used convexity of C. Hence, x + (δ/2) y ∈ C, as desired.
We will let ZOO operate on the set C δ instead of C, and we first want to show that there is little loss in profit if we restrict the induced bundle to C δ . The following is just a formal, quantitative version of of Assumption 3.2: Given this assumption, the profit function is also Hölder continuous.
Lemma 19.
For any x, y ∈ C such that x − y ≤ 1, the following holds
Proof. Recall the revenue component of the profit is ∇v(x), x . Since v is a concave and homogeneous function, we know that the homogeneity degree satisfies k ≤ 1. (See the full version for a proof). By Euler's theorem (Theorem 11),
Since v is (λ val , β)-Hölder continuous C, by Equation 9 we know that the revenue ∇v(x), x is also λ val -Hölder continuous over C.
Furthermore, since the cost function c is λcost-Lipschitz over C, the profit function satisfies the following: for any x, y ∈ C such that x − y ≤ 1, we have
We can bound the difference between the optimal profits in C δ and C.
Lemma 20. For any 0 < δ ≤ 1/3γ,
Proof. Let x * ∈ arg maxx∈C r(x). We know that (1 − 2δ)x * + δ1 ∈ C δ , and
By Lemma 19, we then have
Furthermore, we also know maxx∈C δ r(x) ≥ r((1 − δ)x * + δ1), so we have shown the bound above. Now we focus on how to optimize the profit function r over the set C δ . Recall the algorithm ZOO requires approximate evaluations for the profit function r. Such evaluations can be implemented using our algorithm LearnPrice: for each bundle x ∈ C δ , run LearnPrice(x, ε) to obtain a price vector p such that x−x * (p) ≤ ε, and then the resulting profit r(x * (p)) serves as an approximate evaluation for r(x):
Algorithm 2 Learning the price vector to optimize profit: Opro(C, α) Input: Feasible bundle space C, and target accuracy α Initialize:
restricted bundle space C δ = (1 − 2δ)C + δ1 and number of iterations
ZOO(α , C δ ) queries the profit for bundle x t Let p t = LearnPrice(x t , ε) and observe the induced bundle
Output: the last price vector p Theorem 21. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation Opro(C, α) computes a price vector p such that the expected profit
the number of times it calls the algorithm LearnPrice is bounded bỹ O(d 4.5 ), and the total observations it requires from the consumer is poly(d, 1/α).
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Proof. First we show that each induced bundle x * (p t ) is in the interior IntC . Note that in the algorithm, we have ε = δ/4. By the guarantee of LearnPrice in Theorem 12, we have that
By Claim 18, we know that x t ∈ Int C,δ/2 , so the ball of radius ε centered at x t is contained in C, and hence x * (p t ) is in the interior of C. By Lemma 17 and Lemma 9, each vector p t = ∇v(x * (p t )) is the profit-maximizing prices for the induced bundle x * (p t ), so the profit the algorithm observes is indeed r(x * (p t )). Next, to establish the accuracy guarantee, we need to bound two sources of error. First, we need to bound the error from ZOO. To simplify notation, let λ = (λ val + λcost). Recall from Lemma 19 that the approximate profit evaluation r(x * (p t )) satisfies
By the accuracy guarantee in Lemma 7, the final queried bundle x satisfies
Since we know that |r( x) − r(x * ( p))|≤ λε, we also have
Next, as we are restricting the bundle space to C δ , there might be further loss of profit. Note that δ = 4ε ≤ 1/3γ, so we can bound it with Lemma 20:
If we plug in our setting for parameter ε, we recover the desired bound since r(x * ( p)) = r( p) and maxx∈C r(x) = max p∈R d + r(p). Finally, we need to bound the total number of observations the algorithm needs from the consumer. In each iteration, the instantiation LearnPrice(x t , ε) requires number of observations bounded by according to Theorem 12
Therefore, after plugging in ε, we have that the total number of observations Opro needs is bounded by
(hiding constants λcost, λ val , σ, γ).
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF STACKELBERG GAMES
Now that we have worked out a concrete application of our method in the context of learning to maximize revenue from revealed preferences, we will abstract our techniques and show how they can be used to solve a general family of Stackelberg games in which the objective of the follower is unknown to the leader. Along the way, we will also generalize our technique to operate in a setting in which the follower responds to the leaders actions by only approximately maximizing her utility function. In addition to generalizing the settings in which our approach applies, this avoids a technical concern that might otherwise arise -that bundles maximizing strongly concave utility functions might be non-rational. In addition to being able to handle approximations to optimal bundles that would be induced by taking a rational approximation, we show our method is robust to much larger errors.
In our general framework, we consider a Stackelberg game that consists of a leader with action set AL and a follower with action set AF . Each player has a utility function UL, UF : AL × AF → R. In the corresponding Stackelberg game, the leader chooses an action p ∈ AL, and then the follower chooses a ζ-best response x (p) such that
is the follower's exact bestresponse. Note that when ζ = 0, x (p) = x * (p). The example of maximizing revenue from revealed preferences is a special case of this framework. The producer is the leader and his action space consists of prices p and the follower is the consumer and her action space is the bundle x she purchases. The producer's utility for a pair (p, x) is his revenue minus the cost of producing x and the consumer's utility is her value for x minus the price she pays.
In general, we consider solving the leader's optimization problemfind p ∈ AL such that UL(p, x * (p)) is (approximately) maximized. Formally, we consider a sub-class of Stackelberg games that have the following structure.
Definition 22. An instance is a Stackelberg game S(AL, AF , φ)
which consists of two players-the leader and the follower such that:
• the leader has action set AL ⊆ R d , the follower has action set AF ⊆ R d , both of which are convex and compact;
• the follower's utility function UF : AL × AF → R takes the form
where φ: R d → R is a strongly concave, differentiable function unknown to the leader;
• the leader's utility function UL: AL × AF → R is an unknown function.
The optimization problem associated with the game instance is maxp∈A L ψ(p, x * (p)).
Our first step to solve the problem is to rewrite the leader's utility function so that it can be expressed as a function only in the follower's action. For each action of the follower x ∈ AF , the set of leader's actions that induce x is
Among all of the leader's actions that induce x, the optimal one is:
where ties are broken arbitrarily. We can then rewrite the leader's objective as a function of only x:
Note that to approximately solve the leader's optimization problem, it is sufficient to find the follower's action x ∈ AF which approximately optimizes ψF (·), together with the action p ∈ AL that approximately induces x. Before we present the algorithm, we state the assumptions on the utility functions of the two players that we will need. Assumption 4.1. The game S(AL, AF , φ) satisfies the following properties.
1. The function ψ: AL → R defined in (10) is concave and λL-Lipschitz;
2. The function φ: AF → R is non-decreasing, σ-strongly concave and λF -Lipschitz;
3. The action space of the leader AL contains the following set
4. The action space of the follower AF has bounded diameter, AF ≤ γ.
Inducing a Target Action of the Follower
We first consider the following sub-problem. Given a target action x of the follower we want to learn an action p for the leader such that the induced action satisfies
We now give an algorithm to learn p that requires only polynomially many observations of the follower's ζ-approximate best responses.
Algorithm 3 Learning the leader's action to induce a target follower's action: LearnLead( x, ε)
Input: A target follower action x ∈ AF , and target accuracy ε Initialize: restricted action space
Observe the induced action by the follower x * (p t ) Update leader's action:
Theorem 23. Let x ∈ AF be a target follower action and ε > 0. Then LearnLead( x, ε) outputs a leader action p such that the induced follower action satisfies x − x ( p) ≤ ε and the number of observations it needs is no more than
as long as ε > 2 2ζ/σ.
Optimizing Leader's Utility
Now that we know how to approximately induce any action of the follower using LearnLead, we are ready to give an algorithm to optimize the leader's utility function UL. Recall that we can write the UL as a function ψ that depends only of the follower's action. In order to obtain the approximately optimal utility ψ(x), the leader must play the optimal action p that induces the follower to play approximately x. Assumption 4.2. For any x ∈ AF and ε > 0, the instantiation LearnLead( x, ε) returns p such that
Whenever this assumption holds, we can use LearnLead to allow the leader to obtain utility UL( p, x * ( p)) = ψ(x * ( p)). While Assumption 4.2 appears to be quite strong, we can often achieve it. Recall that we were able to satisfy Assumption 4.2 in our revealed preferences application by operating in the interior of the feasible region of the follower's action space, and we can similarly do this in our principal-agent example. Moreover, it is trivially satisfied whenever the leader's objective function depends only on the follower's action, since in this case, every leader-action p which induces a particular follower-action x is optimal. This is the case, for example, in our routing games application in Section 5. Now we will show how to use the algorithm ZOO to find an approximate optimal point for the function ψ. First, we will use LearnLead to provide approximate function evaluation for ψ at each x ∈ AF : our algorithm first runs LearnLead( x, ε) to learn a price vector p, and we will use the observed function value on the induced follower's approximate best response ψ(x ( p)) as an approximation for ψ( x). Since LearnLead guarantees that x ( p)− x ≤ ε, by the Lipschitz property of ψ we have
With these approximate evaluations, ZOO can then find a (dλLε)-approximate optimizer of ψ with onlyÕ(d ZOO(dελL, AF ) queries the objective value for action x t ∈ AF Let p t = LearnLead(x t , ε) and observe the induced action
Output: the leader action p Theorem 24. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation LearnOpt(AF , α) computes a leader action p along with its induced follower action x * ( p) that satisfies
and the number of observations the algorithm requires of the follower is bounded byÕ , as long as α ≥ Ω(dλL ζ/σ).
OPTIMAL TRAFFIC ROUTING FROM REVEALED BEHAVIOR
In this section, we give the second main application of our technique discussed in the introduction: how to find tolls to induce an approximately optimal flow in a non-atomic traffic routing game when the latency functions are unknown.
A nonatomic routing game G(G, , D) is defined by a graph G = (V, E), latency function e on each edge e ∈ E, and the source, destination and demands for n commodities: D = {(si, ti, ki)} i∈ [n] . The latency function e: R+ → [0, 1] represents the delay on each edge e as a function of the total flow on that edge. For simplicity, we assume n i=1 ki = 1, and we let m denote the number of edges |E|.
For each commodity i, the demand ki specifies the volume of flow from si to ti routed by (self-interested) agents. The game is nonatomic: infinitely many agents each control only an infinitesimal amount of flow and each agent of type i selects an action (an si-ti path) so as to minimize her total latency. The aggregate decisions of the agents induce a multicommodity flow (f i ) i∈[n] , with each
where Fi is the flow polytope for the i'th commodity:
for each i} denote the set of feasible flows. A flow f defines a latency e(fe) on each edge e. Given a path P , we write P (f ) = e∈P e(fe) to denote the sum latency on all edges in the path. A Nash or Wardrop equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 25 (Wardrop equilibrium). A multicommodity flow f is a Wardrop equilibrium of a routing game if it is feasible and for every commodity i, and for all si-ti paths P, Q with f
Crucial to our application is the following well known lemma, which states that a Wardrop equilibrium can be found as the solution to a optimization problem (convex whenever the latencies are nondecreasing), which minimizes a potential function associated with the routing game Lemma 26 ( [19] ). A Wardrop equilibrium can be computed by solving the following optimization problem:
Whenever the latency functions e are each non-decreasing, this is a convex program. We call Φ the potential function of the routing game.
Now suppose there is a municipal authority which administers the network and wishes to minimize the social cost of the equilibrium flow:
The authority has the power to impose constant tolls on the edges. A toll vector τ = (τe)e∈E ∈ R m + induces a new latency function on each edge: τ e (fe) = (fe) + τe, which gives rise to a different routing game G(G, τ , D) with a new potential function Φ τ . In particular, the equilibrium flow f * (τ ) induced by the toll vector is the Wardrop equilibrium of the tolled routing game:
While the latency functions are unknown to the authority, his goal is to find a toll vector τ such that the induced flow f * ( τ ) approximately minimizes the total congestion function Ψ.
We can formulate this problem as an instance of the type of Stackelberg game we defined in Definition 22, where the authority is the leader, and there is a single "flow" player minimizing the game's potential function, serving the role of the follower. We will refer to them as the toll player and the flow player respectively. In our setting:
1. The toll player has action set τ ∈ R m + and the flow player has action set F;
2. The flow player has a utility function UF :
3. The toll player has a utility function UL:
Now we will apply the tools in Section 4 to solve this problem. Before we begin, we will impose the following assumptions on the latency functions to match with Assumption 4.1. We need two types of assumptions: one set to let us find tolls to induce a target flow, and another to guarantee that once we can induce such flows (and hence implement a "flow cost oracle"), we can optimize over flows.
To find tolls to induce a target flow, we require that the potential function Φ be strongly convex in the flow variables. The following conditions are sufficient to guarantee this: Assumption 5.1. For each edge e ∈ E, e is differentiable and has derivative bounded away from zero: there exists some σ > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], e (x) ≥ σ.
Recall that the potential function Φ(x) is a function on m variables (fe)e∈E, and it's Hessian ∇ 2 Φ at each f ∈ F is a diagonal matrix with entries e (fe) ≥ σ. Therefore, we know that ∇ 2 Φ(f ) σI for any f ∈ F , and so under Assumption 5.1, Φ is a σ-strongly convex function over F. Note that the only condition we really require is that the potential function be strongly convex, and there are weaker conditions that imply this, but we state Assumption 5.1 because of its simplicity.
Once we can implement a flow oracle, we need to be able to use a bandit convex optimization algorithm to optimize social cost over flows. Hence, we require that the social cost function be convex and Lipschitz. The following assumptions are sufficient to guarantee this: Assumption 5.2. For each edge e ∈ E, e is convex and (λ/m)-Lipschitz continuous over [0, 1] .
Note that this guarantees that Ψ is λ-Lipschitz over F. We first show that we can use the algorithm LearnLead to learn a toll vector to induce any flow as a Wardrop equilibrium.
Lemma 27. Fix any non-atomic routing game satisfying Assumption 5.1. Let f ∈ F in a target flow and ε > 0. Then the instantiation LearnLead( f , ε) outputs a toll vector τ such that the induced Wardrop equilibrium flow f * ( τ ) satisfies f − f * ( τ ) ≤ ε, and the number of observations on the flow behavior it needs is no more than
Proof. Before we apply Theorem 23, we still need to show that the potential function Φ of the original routing game (without tolls) is Lipschitz over F. Note that this does not require any assumptions on the latency functions e other than that they are bounded in [0, 1]. Let f, g ∈ F, then we can write Pre-processing Step.
The set F is not a well-rounded convex body in R m (it has zero volume), so we will have to apply the following standard preprocessing step to transform it into a well-rounded body. First, we find a maximal set I of linearly independent points in F. We will then embed the polytope F into this lower-dimensional subspace spanned by I, so that F becomes full-dimensional. In this subspace, F is a convex body with a relative interior. Next, we apply the transformation of [18] to transform F into a well-rounded body within Span(I). 5 We will run ZOO over the transformed body.
Lemma 28. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation LearnOpt(AF , α) computes a toll vector τ such that the induced flow f = f * ( τ ) is α-approximately optimal in expectation:
The total number of observations we need on the flow behavior is bounded byÕ Remark 29. Just as with the profit maximization example, if we do not require noise tolerance, then we can improve the dependence on the approximation parameter α to be polylogarithmic. We show how to do this in the full version.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given algorithms for optimally solving a large class of Stackelberg games in which the leader has only "revealed preferences" feedback about the follower's utility function, with applications both to profit maximization from revealed preferences data, and optimal tolling in congestion games. We believe this is a very natural model in which to have access to agent utility functions, and that pursuing this line of work will be fruitful. There are many interesting directions, but let us highlight one in particular. In our profit maximization application, it would be very natural to consider a "Bayesian" version of our problem. At each round, the producer sets prices, at which point a new consumer, with valuation function drawn from an unknown prior, purchases her utility maximizing bundle. The producer's goal is to find the prices that maximize her expected profit, over draws from the unknown prior. Under what conditions can we solve this problem efficiently? The main challenge (and the reason why it likely requires new techniques) is that the expected value of the purchased bundle need not maximize any well-behaved utility function, even if each individual consumer is maximizing a concave utility function. Let SC (τ1, τ2) be the function that maps a pair of tolls for the two A → B edges to the social cost (excluding the tolls) of the equi- 6 Since the graph is a DAG, we can use backwards induction. From A, it can never cost more to go A → B → T than to go A → T . Since one can go from A to B for a cost of 0, players are indifferent about ending up at node A and node B. Since S → A can never cost more than S → B, and players are indifferent between A and B, every player would choose the path S → A → B → T (using the 0 latency path from A to B. 7 At these tolls, no player will never use either A → B edge. Thus, they will balance the traffic so that S → A → T and S → B → T have equal cost. By symmetry, half will go through A and half through B.
librium routing. For each of the inputs we consider, the equilibrium will be unique, so multiplicity of equilibria is irrelevant.
First, consider the set of tolls τ = τ1 = τ2 = 0. It is not hard to verify that the unique equilibrium is for every player to use the route S → A → B → T using the A → B edge on the right (with latency 0). 6 Each player will experience a total latency of 1 along their route. Thus SC (τ ) = 8n/10. Now consider the tolls τ in which τ1 = 1, τ2 = 2. At these tolls, it is not hard to verify that the unique equilibrium is for n/2 players to use S → A → T and half to use S → B → T . 7 Every player experiences a total latency of 2/10 + 1/2 = 7/10. Thus SC (t ) = 7n/10.
Finally, consider the convex combination 99τ /100 + τ /100 in which τ1 = 1/100 and τ2 = 1/50. In this case, the unique equilibrium routing will have every player use the route S → A → B → T but using the A → B edge on the left (with latency 1/200 and latency-plus-toll 3/200). To see why, observe that if a player were at A, then no matter what the other players are doing, the cheapest path to T is to go A → B → T using the left edge (note that the right edge has latency-plus-toll 1/50 whereas the left edge has latency-plus-toll 3/200). Thus, the cost of going B → T is exactly 1/2 and the cost of going A → B → T is exactly 1/2 + 3/200. Now, if the player is at S, going S → B → T costs exactly 1, whereas going S → A → B → T costs at most we can see that the function SC (τ ) is not convex in τ .
